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Abstract
We study a classical Bayesian mechanism design problem where a seller is selling multiple items to
multiple buyers. We consider the case where the seller has costs to produce the items, and these costs
are private information to the seller. How can the seller design a mechanism to maximize her profit?
Two well-studied problems, revenue maximization in multi-item auctions and signaling in ad auctions,
are special cases of our problem. We show that there exists a simple mechanism whose profit is at least
1
44 of the optimal profit for multiple buyers with matroid-rank valuation functions. When there is a
single buyer, the approximation factor is 11 for general constraint-additive valuations and 6 for additive
valuations. Our result holds even when the seller’s costs are correlated across items.
We introduce a new class of mechanisms called permit-selling mechanisms. For single buyer case
these mechanisms are quite simple: there are two stages. For each item j, we create a separate permit
that allows the buyer to purchase the item in the second stage. In the first stage, we sell the permits
without revealing any information about the costs. In the second stage, the seller reveals all the costs,
and the buyer can buy item j by paying the item price if the buyer has purchased the permit for item j in
the first stage. We show that either selling the permits separately or as a grand bundle suffices to achieve
the constant factor approximation to the optimal profit (6 for additive, and 11 for constrained additive).
For multiple buyers, we sell the permits sequentially and obtain the constant factor approximation. Our
proof is enabled by constructing a benchmark for the optimal profit by combining a novel dual solution
with the existing ex-ante relaxation technique.
∗Part of Yang Cai’s work is done under the support of NSERC Discovery RGPIN-2015-06127 and FRQNT 2017-NC-198956.
†Supported by Richard H. Tomlinson Doctoral Fellowship and NSERC Discovery RGPIN-2015-06127.
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1 Introduction
We study the profit maximization problem for selling multiple items to multiple buyers. Unlike most works
in Mechanism Design, we consider the case where the seller has costs for obtaining the items. As these costs
usually depend on private information that is only available to the seller, we assume that the costs are private
to the seller but are drawn from a distribution also known to the buyers. The goal is to design a mechanism
that maximizes the profit, that is, the total revenue less the total cost. Revenue maximization in multi-item
auctions, one of the most classical and widely studied problem in Bayesian Mechanism Design [10, 11, 6,
8, 2, 29, 16, 17, 25, 27], is a special case of our problem, where the seller always has cost 0 for each item.
Arguably, it is more natural and general to assume that there is a cost associated with each item. It may be
production cost or opportunity cost, e.g., there is an outside option to sell the item at a certain price.
Despite being realistic and widely applicable, the profit maximization problem is not well-understood.
To the best of our knowledge, the only case with non-zero costs that has been studied is in the context of
ad auctions [4, 24, 20, 22, 18]. The problem models the following scenario. The auctioneer is selling an
ad displaying slot to an advertiser. There are m types of viewers of the webpage. The advertiser has value
tj for displaying his ad to a type j viewer. In an ad auction, only the auctioneer observes the type of the
viewer, and the advertiser only knows a prior distribution pi from which the viewer-type is drawn from. What
mechanism maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue? We can easily cast this problem as a profit maximization
problem. Let there be m items. When the viewer has type j, assign item j with cost 0 and all the other
items with cost∞. Clearly, maximizing revenue in the ad auction is equivalent to maximizing profit in the
corresponding multi-item setting, as the seller will never sell any item with∞ cost. Many results are known
for this special case, which we will discuss in Section 1.4.
In revenue maximization, the optimal mechanism is known to be randomized and complex in multi-
item settings. Instead of characterizing the optimal mechanisms, a major and successful research theme in
Mechanism Design is devoted to designing simple and approximately optimal mechanisms [10, 11, 13, 2, 8,
27, 28, 31, 7, 9, 29]. As our problem generalizes the multi-item revenue maximization problem, it is clear
that the profit-optimal mechanism also requires complex allocation rules and randomization. In this paper,
we focus on designing simple and approximately optimal mechanisms for profit maximization.
To facilitate the discussion, we will first focus on the single buyer case. In our model, there are m
items for sale, and the seller has cost cj for parting with item j. The costs (c1, . . . , cm) are drawn from a
distribution C that is known to both the seller and the buyer. We allow the seller’s costs to be correlated
across items. Consider constrained-additive buyers, that is, the buyer has a downward-closed feasibility
constraint F ⊆ 2[m] that specifies what bundles of items are allowed. The buyer has value tj for item j,
and her value for a bundle S is defined as maxA∈F ,A⊆S
∑
i∈A tj . Similar to most results in the simple vs.
optimal literature, we assume tj to be drawn from Dj independently across items.
Before we state our results, let us examine two natural but unsuccessful attempts to solve this problem.
Two unsuccessful attempts: (i) Use a mechanism that (approximately) optimizes the revenue. This is
a terrible solution as some of the items sold by the mechanism may have extremely high costs, and as a
result the mechanism only generates low if any profit. (ii) After the seller sees the costs, reveal them to the
buyer, then use the optimal or approximately optimal mechanism that is tailored to those particular costs.
The reason why this mechanism may be far away from optimal is much more subtle. Let us consider the
following example in the ad auction setting 1.
1The example is similar to the example that shows the revenue of selling the items separately could be Ω(logn)-factor worse
than the optimal revenue in multi-item auctions with an additive bidder.
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Example 1. A random variableX with support [1,+∞) follows the equal revenue (ER) distribution if and
only if Pr [X ≤ x] = 1− 1x . LetDj be the ER distribution for each item j. Define δj to be the n-dimensional
vector whose j-th entry is 0 and all the other entries are∞. Let the costs (c1, . . . , cm) = δj have probability
1/n for each j.
The expected profit of the mechanism in (ii):
∑
j∈[m]
1
m ·maxp p · Prtj∼Dj [tj ≥ p] = 1. Since for every
j, after revealing cost δj , the seller can only sell item j to the buyer.
Consider an alternative mechanism which does not reveal the costs, but offers the buyer the following
contract: if the buyer pays logm/2 up front, the buyer can take any item that is available, e.g. has cost 0.
The chance that the buyer accepts the contract is
Pr
 1
m
·
∑
j∈[m]
tj ≥ logm
2
 ,
and due to a Lemma by [27], we know that it is at least 1/2. Hence, the mechanism has profit at least logm4 .
Note that in the second mechanism of our example, the seller does not even reveal any information to
the buyer and extracts much higher profit.
The two failed attempts highlight two major challenges of our problem: (i) how to balance the revenue
and cost; (ii) how to capture the informational rent of the buyer, that is, leveraging the fact that the costs
are private information to extract more revenue. We overcome these two challenges by considering what
we called permit-selling mechanisms. These mechanisms have two stages. For each item j, we create a
separate permit that allows the buyer to purchase the item at its cost. In the first stage, we sell the permits
without revealing any information about the actual costs. In the second stage, the seller reveals all the costs,
and the buyer can buy item j by only paying the cost cj if the buyer has purchased the permit for item j in
the first stage. How does the buyer make a decision in such a mechanism? In the first stage, the buyer needs
to choose her favorite bundle of permits to purchase. Since she knows the distribution C, she can compute
her utility for each bundle of permits. In the second stage, the buyer simply picks her favorite set of items
based on the permits she own, the costs of the items, and her valuation function. Why do the permit-selling
mechanisms help addressing the two challenges? Note that the profit of the permit-selling mechanisms is
exactly the revenue from the first stage, so any mechanism that achieves high revenue in the first stage also
generates high profit. Moreover, the buyer needs to make a decision on what permits to purchase without
learning the costs, therefore, the seller can extract the informational rent by pricing the permits appropriately.
Indeed, we do not even need to use any complex pricing scheme in the first stage. We sell the permits
separately or sell them as a grand bundle. In our proof we need one more mechanism, which simply sells
the items separately, and the prices change according to the seller’s costs. The reason why this class of
mechanism is required is more subtle and we only sketch the intuition here. In the permit-selling mechanism,
for a fixed buyer type profile t, the buyer purchases a set of permits P and thus the seller can only extract
revenue from items in P , no matter what realized costs she has. However, for different cost vectors, the seller
may have different items from which she can extract more revenue. By posting item prices that depend on
her cost, the seller is able to target the profitable items based on her realized cost vector. This approach does
not capture the informational rent but may generate high profit in certain cases.
Here are the mechanisms we use.
• sell-items-separately (IS): for each possible cost vector c = (c1, · · · , cm), sell the items separately,
and the price pj(c) for item j depends on c.
• sell-permits-separately (PS): sell the permits separately, and the price pj for the j-th permit is inde-
pendent from the seller’s costs.
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• permit-bundling (PB): sell all the permits as a grand bundle at a price p that is independent from the
seller’s costs.
Since in all these mechanisms, the seller does not even ask the buyer to report her valuation, the mech-
anism is clear incentive compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR). We show that the best mechanism
among these three classes of mechanisms can already achieve a constant fraction of the optimal profit.
Theorem 1. For any valuation distribution D = D1 × . . . × Dm, cost distribution C, and any downward-
closed feasibility constraint F , the best mechanism among all sell-items-separately, sell-permits-separately,
and permit-bundling mechanisms is an 11-approximation to the optimal profit.
When the buyer’s valuation is additive, we can improve the approximation factor to 6.
Theorem 2. If the buyer has additive valuation, for any valuation distribution D = D1 × . . . × Dm and
cost distribution C, the best mechanism among all sell-items-separately, sell-permits-separately, and permit-
bundling mechanisms is a 6-approximation to the optimal profit.
We then generalize the result to accommodate multiple buyers with matroid-rank valuation functions.
With multiple buyers, we sell the permits with a sequential mechanism: buyers arrive in some arbitrary
order. When a buyer arrives, we first offer the buyer the permits without revealing any information about
the seller’s cost or other buyers’ types. Next, the buyer is given the remaining item set as well as an item
price for each item. For single buyer case the item price is always chosen as the seller’s cost for this item.
Now we allow any prices that may depend on the cost vector.2 Again the buyer can purchase any item from
the remaining item set by paying the corresponding item price, if she has the permit for it. The mechanism
is BIC and interim IR as the buyer needs to purchase the permit without knowing the seller’s cost or what
items are still available. In the proof ,we use Sequential Permit Posted Price (SPP) mechanisms that sell
permits separately and Sequential Permit Bundling (SPB) mechanisms that sell permits as a whole bundle.
Similar to the single buyer case, we need another mechanism called Constrained Sequential Item Posted
Price mechanism (CSIP). It resembles the Sequential Posted Price mechanism from [11]: the items are
sold sequentially with posted prices that depend on the seller’s cost vector. The mechanism also imposes a
constraint on the set of items a buyer can purchase. See Section 2 for more details.
We prove that the best of three classes of mechanisms can already achieve a constant fraction of the
optimal profit.
Theorem 3. For any cost distribution and buyers’ valuation distributions, if every buyer has a matroid-rank
valuation, the best mechanism among all CSIP, restricted SPP3, and SPB mechanisms is a 44-approximation
to the optimal profit.
1.1 Proof Sketch and Techniques
Since the costs are private, it is a priori not clear that it is sufficient to consider only direct mechanisms.
Indeed, signaling mechanisms, a class of indirect mechanisms, are widely studied in the ad auction setting [4,
24, 20, 22, 18]. We first prove a revelation principle for our problem similar to the one proved in [18] for
ad auctions. Our revelation principle states that w.l.o.g. we can restrict our attention to direct, BIC, and
interim IR mechanisms. Moreover, we can formulate the profit maximization problem as an LP. We next
apply the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework [7]. The framework has become a standard tool for
2In the proof, the item prices is always chosen to be no less than the seller’s cost.
3It’s closed to the Sequential Permit Posted Price mechanism, except that the mechanism may hide some items randomly,
preventing the buyer from buying some item even she has permit. See Section 2 for more details.
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analyzing the performance of simple mechanisms. In most of the results based on this duality approach, a
particular family of dual variables, called the “canonical dual” [7, 9], is used to provide a benchmark for the
objective function. However, this set of dual variables does not provide an appropriate benchmark due to
the existence of costs. We propose a new set of dual variables that is tailored to handle the costs. Indeed,
these dual variables are so informative that they inspired us to introduce the permit-selling mechanisms. In
the multi-buyer case, the choice of the dual variables is also inspired by the ex-ante relaxation technique
from [13]. A similar set of dual variables are used in [9] to provided a benchmark for the optimal revenue.
The benchmark induced by our dual variables can be easily decomposed into three components –
MOST-SURPLUS, PROPHET and LESS-SURPLUS. MOST-SURPLUS can be bounded by the profit of the
CSIP mechanism using relatively standard analysis. For PROPHET, we bound the term using the same class
of mechanisms, with the help of the Online Contention Resolution Scheme [23].
For LESS-SURPLUS, in order to establish a connection between profit maximization and revenue max-
imization, we provide a separate and clean proof for the single buyer case. Instead of directly analyzing
the term, we construct an auxiliary revenue maximization problem for selling m items to help approximate
LESS-SURPLUS. Intuitively, each item in the auxiliary problem corresponds to a permit. We first show
that any mechanism in the auxiliary problem can be turned into a permit-selling mechanism in the origi-
nal problem, such that the revenue in the auxiliary problem is the same as the profit of the permit-selling
mechanism. Next, we argue that the buyer has subadditive valuation in the auxiliary problem whenever the
buyer has constrained additive valuation in the original problem. Note that the better of selling the items
separately and grand bundling is a constant factor approximation of the optimal revenue when the buyer has
subadditive valuation [29, 9]. Unfortunately, we cannot use this approximation as a black-box, as it is not yet
clear how the revenue in the auxiliary problem relates to the LESS-SURPLUS term. Luckily, Cai and Zhao
obtain their result via the CDW duality framework, and in their analysis, they show that a term identical
to LESS-SURPLUS can be approximated by the revenue of selling the items separately or grand bundling.
Putting everything together, we prove that the profit of a sell-permits-separately or permit-bundling mech-
anism approximates LESS-SURPLUS, and that completes our proof. For general case, it’s not straightfor-
ward build such a connection. We use the standard Core-Tail Decomposition technique [28, 7], dividing
LESS-SURPLUS further into two terms TAIL and CORE. TAIL can be approximated using RSPP. For CORE,
it can be viewed as all buyers’ truncated welfare with respect to a related fractionally-subadditive valuation
and we can bound it using SPB and RSPP, by applying the Talagrands concentration inequality [30].
1.2 Our Contributions
Our main contributions in this paper are the followings:
• We introduce the permit-selling mechanisms and demonstrate their ability to approximate the optimal
profit.
• We construct a new set of dual variables that can accommodate costs.
• We establish a connection between profit maximization and revenue maximization for the single buyer
case.
1.3 Our Model vs. Two-sided Markets
There has been increasing interest in two-sided markets in the Economics and Computation community
recently [14, 15, 21, 3, 5, 1]. In a two-sided market, the mechanism should be designed to incentivize both
buyers and sellers to reveal their true private information. Our model is related to the two-sided markets
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but differs in the following crucial way, that is, we assume that the seller has committing power: the seller
commits to a mechanism and follows the mechanism honestly. In other words, the mechanism does not need
to satisfy the seller’s Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint in our model. This is a standard assumption
used in both mechanism design for one-sided markets where the seller is also the designer of the mechanism,
as well as in information design where the designer commits to a certain information structure. For example,
in ad auctions, the seller receives a piece of private information, the type of the item, and sends a signal to
the buyer based on this private information using a pre-committed signaling scheme. The model assumes
that the seller follows the signaling scheme honestly and does not impose any IC constraints on the seller.
1.4 Related Work
There is a large body of beautiful work on simple vs. optimal for revenue maximization in multi-item
auctions [10, 11, 12, 26, 8, 28, 2, 31, 7, 13, 29, 9]. They showed that simple mechanisms can extract
a constant fraction of the optimal revenue in rich settings. If there is a single buyer, the state-of-the-art
results [29, 9] apply to subadditive valuation functions; if there are multiple buyers, the state-of-the-art
result [9] applies to XOS valuation functions. However, none of these results considered costs.
The ad auction problem has also been extensively studied in the literature [4, 24, 20, 22, 18]. Signaling
mechanisms had been the focus. In a signaling mechanism, the seller first sends a signal to the buyer based
on the type of the viewer and according to a signaling scheme known to the buyer. The buyer updates her
posterior belief of the viewer type after observing the signal. The seller then uses a mechanism tailored
to the buyer’s updated posterior to sell the ad displaying slot. Many results have been obtained regarding
the revenue-optimal signaling scheme. Overall, the optimal signaling scheme may be highly complex and
hard to pin down. Interestingly, Daskalakis et al. showed that even if we can find the optimal signaling
scheme the corresponding mechanism can still be bounded away from the optimum [18]. They showed that
the optimal mechanism is direct and does not involve any signaling. Motivated by their result, we focus on
simple and direct mechanisms.
In [18], they also showed how to use simple mechanisms to approximate the auctioneer’s profit in an ad
auction. They established the result by reducing the problem to revenue maximization in multi-item auctions
with an additive buyer. However, their reduction is ad-hoc and heavily relies on a specific property of their
cost distribution, that is, the cost is always one of the δis (see Example 1 for the definition). When the cost
distribution is general, their reduction no longer holds, and thus is inapplicable to our problem.
2 Preliminaries
We consider the auction where a seller is selling m heterogeneous items to n buyers. We denote buyer i’s
type ti as 〈tij〉mj=1, where tij is buyer i’s value for item j. For each i, j, we assume tij is drawn independently
from the distribution Dij . Let Di = ×mj=1Dij be the distribution of buyer i’s type and D = ×ni=1Di be the
distribution of the type profile. We use Tij (or Ti, T ) and fij (or fi, f ) to denote the support and density
function of Dij (or Di, D). For notational convenience, we let t to be the types profile of all buyers, t−i to
be the types of all buyers except i and t<i (or t≤i) to be the types of the first i − 1 (or i) buyers. Similarly,
we define D−i, T−i and f−i for the corresponding distributions, support sets and density functions.
Each buyer has a constraint-additive valuation, which implies that she is additive over the items but is
only allowed to receive a set of items that is feasible with respect to a downward-closed family Fi ⊆ 2[m].
In other words, the buyer with type ti has value vi(ti, S) = maxT⊆S,T∈Fi
∑
j∈T tij when receiving set S.
For multiple buyer setting we consider a special case of constraint-additive valuation called matroid-rank,
where each Fi is a matroid. On the other hand, the seller has a private cost cj for producing each item j.
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Denote c the cost vector and c is drawn from distribution C. Let TS be the support of C. We allow correlated
costs in our problem.
For any direct4 mechanism M and any t, c, denote xij(t, c) the probability that buyer i is receiving item
j, when the buyers has type profile t and seller has cost c. Let piij(ti, c) = Et−i [xij(t, c)] be the interim
allocation probability. Similarly, use pi(t, c) to denote the payment for buyer i. For any t and c, buyer i’s
utility ui(t, c) = ti · xi(t, c)− pi(t, c). The seller has profit (revenue minus cost)
∑
i(pi(t, c)− c · xi(t, c)).
We now define the incentive compatibility and individual rationality for our setting.
• Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC): reporting the true value maximizes the buyer’s expected utility
Et−i,c[ui(ti, t−i, c)].
• Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC): for every c and every t−i, reporting the true value
maximizes the buyer’s utility ui(ti, t−i, c).
• interim Individual Rational (interim IR): reporting the true value induces non-negative expected utility.
Et−i,c[ui(ti, t−i, c)] ≥ 0.
• ex-post Individual Rational (ex-post IR): for every c and t−i, reporting the true value induces non-
negative utility. ui(ti, t−i, c) ≥ 0.
If the mechanism allocates set S to some buyer, and the buyer is only interested in a feasible subset of
items U ⊂ S, the mechanism can simply allocate set U instead. This does not affect the truthfulness for all
buyers and increases the seller’s profit. In this paper, we will only consider mechanisms that always allocate
a feasible set of items U ∈ Fi to each buyer i. Denote P({Fi}ni=1) the region for all feasible allocations x.
For every mechanism M , denote PROFIT(D, C, {Fi}ni=1,M) the seller’s expected profit in M . We use
PROFIT(M) for short when (D, C, {Fi}ni=1) is clear and fixed.
PROFIT(M) =
∑
i
E
t,c
[pi(t, c)− c · xi(t, c)]
As we will explain in Lemma 1, it is w.l.o.g. to only consider direct, BIC, and interim IR mecha-
nisms. Let OPTPROFIT(D, C, {Fi}ni=1) be the optimal profit among all BIC and interim IR mechanisms (use
OPTPROFIT for short when (D, C, {Fi}ni=1) is clear and fixed). Our goal is to use a simple mechanism to
approximate OPTPROFIT.
2.1 Our Mechanisms
We bound the optimal profit by the following three classes of mechanisms. The first mechanism is a variant
of the Sequential Item Posted Price (SIP) mechanism, which is first purposed by [11] in the revenue max-
imization problem. Here we allow the seller to decide posted prices according to her cost vector. Before
the auction starts, the seller decides a posted price pij(c) for each buyer i and item j, based on her cost
vector c. Then buyers come one by one in an arbitrary order. Each buyer can choose her favorite bundle
among all remaining items by paying the posted prices. The mechanism is DSIC and ex-post IR. We call
the mechanism Constrained Sequential Item Posted Price (CSIP) if it further adds a sub-constraint on the
set of items the buyer can purchase. The mechanism first decides a constraint J ′(c) on the ground set of all
buyer-item pairs J = {(i, j)|i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]}, based on her true cost c. A (possibly random) set A ⊆ J
represents a way of allocating the items. It’s feasible if
4By Lemma 1, the revelation principle holds in the profit maximization problem. It suffices to consider direct, BIC, and interim
IR mechanisms.
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• Each item is allocated to at most one buyer: ∀j,Oj = {i : (i, j) ∈ A}, |Oj | ≤ 1.
• Each buyer is allocated a feasible set of items: ∀i, Pi = {j : (i, j) ∈ A}, Pi ∈ Fi.
Let J be the family of all feasible sets. J ′(c) must satisfy J ′(c) ⊆ J . When each buyer comes, she is
only allowed to take the item that doesn’t ruin the constraint J ′(c). See Mechanism 1 for details.
Mechanism 1 Constrained Sequential Item Posted Price Mechanism
Require: pij(c), the item price for i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]; the constraint J ′ ⊆ J .
1: A← ∅.
2: for i ∈ [n] do
3: Reveal item prices {pij(c)}mj=1 to the buyer.
4: i can choose a bundle Si such that A ∪ {(i, j)}j∈Si ∈ J ′.
5: i receives her favorite bundle S∗i , paying
∑
j∈S∗i pij(c).
6: A← A ∪ {(i, j)}j∈S∗i .
7: end for
For the CSIP used in our proof, the corresponding sub-constraint J ′(c) can be computed efficiently. See
Section 6.2 for more details. We use CSIP-PROFIT to denote the optimal seller’s profit among all CSIP
mechanisms.
Next, we define the two Sequential Permit Selling mechanisms used in the proof. The second class of
mechanism is called Sequential Permit Posted Price(SPP). Before the auction starts, the seller decides a
posted price pij(c) for each buyer i and item j, based on her cost vector c. Then buyers come one by one in
an arbitrary order. For each buyer i there are two stages: the permit-purchasing stage and item-purchasing
stage. In the permit-purchasing stage, instead of selling the items, the seller sells a permit for each item. She
decides a price lij for permit j independent from the seller’s cost vector c and buyer type profile t. The buyer
is allowed to purchase any permit j ∈ [m] by paying lij . The decision must be made before she sees the
remaining item set Si(t<i, c). In the item-purchasing stage, the seller reveals Si(t<i, c) and her cost vector
c to the buyer, and the buyer can purchase any remaining item j at a price of pij(c) if the buyer has permit j.
The buyer is not allowed to purchase item j if she does not have the corresponding permit. The buyer chooses
her favorite bundle among the items that she is allowed to purchase. Notice that in the second stage, the buyer
with set of permits P ⊆ [m] will choose the bundle S∗ = argmaxS⊆P∩Si(t<i,c),S∈Fi
∑
j∈S(tij − pij(c)).
Thus, in the first stage, by knowing her type ti, all the permit prices lijs, as well as the cost distribution C,
the buyer is able to calculate her expected surplus in the second stage for any P ⊆ Si(t<i). She will hence
choose the best set P ∗ that maximizes her expected utility in the whole auction and buy all the permits in
set P ∗. The mechanism is only BIC and Interim IR as buyers have to make decisions before getting any
information about other buyers’ types and the seller’s costs. See Mechanism 2 for details.
In our proof we will use restricted Sequential Permit Posted Price mechanisms (RSPP) by adding the
following two changes to the mechanism: Firstly, the buyer is only allowed to purchase at most one permit
on the permit-purchasing stage. Secondly, we will further allow the mechanism to hide some items from
the buyer on the item-purchasing stage. Formally, the mechanism will choose a (possibly random) set
S′i(t<i, c) ⊆ Si(t<i, c) and the buyer is only allowed to purchase item in S′i(t<i, c). We will now briefly
explain how our mechanism used in the proof chooses this set. In the proof, the item price pij(c) are chosen
such that for every i, j, c, Prt<i [j ∈ Si(t<i, c)] ≥ 12 . We define the random set S′i(t<i, c) as follows: for any
j ∈ Si(t<i, c), put j in S′i(t<i, c) with probability 12/Prt<i [j ∈ Si(t<i, c)], independently. Now we have
Prt<i [j ∈ S′i(t<i, c)] = 12 . This is a crucial property in the proof (See Lemma 19). In the rest of the paper,
when we mention RSPP, we refer to the mechanism that hides the item as above. We denote RSPP-PROFIT
the optimal profit of these mechanisms.
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Mechanism 2 Sequential Permit Posted Price
Require: lij , pij(c), the permit and item price for i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m].
1: S ← [m]
2: for i ∈ [n] do
3: Show buyer i the permit price lij for every j.
4: i chooses a set of permits P ∗ ⊆ [m] and pays∑j∈P ∗ lij .
5: Reveal S and item prices {pij}mj=1 to the buyer.
6: i receives her favorite bundle S∗i ⊆ S, paying
∑
j∈S∗i pij(c).
7: S ← S\S∗i .
8: end for
The third mechanism is Sequential Permit Bundling(SPB). When every buyer i comes, the seller bundles
the permit of all items together and sell them as a grand bundle at some price δi in the first stage. δi is
independent from c. If the buyer refuses to pay the price, then she gets no permit and therefore cannot
purchase anything in the second stage. If the buyer buys the permit bundle, the seller then reveals the
remaining item set Si(t<i, c) and the item prices {pij(c)}mj=1 to the buyer. The buyer then chooses her
favorite bundle and pays the item prices. The mechanism is also BIC and interim IR due to a similar
argument as for SPP. We use SPB-PROFIT to denote the optimal profit for all SPB mechanisms. See
Mechanism 3 for details.
Mechanism 3 Sequential Permit Bundling
Require: pij(c), item price for i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]; δi, the price for the permit bundle.
1: S ← [m]
2: for i ∈ [n] do
3: Show buyer i the permit bundle price δi.
4: if buyer i pays price δi then
5: Reveal S and item prices {pij}mj=1 to the buyer.
6: i receives her favorite bundle S∗i ⊆ S, paying
∑
j∈S∗i pij(c).
7: S ← S\S∗i .
8: else
9: The buyer pays nothing and receives nothing.
10: end if
11: end for
When there is a single buyer in the auction, the mechanisms described above becomes:
• Item Posted Pricing (IP): for each cost vector c, sell the items separately at price pj(c).
• Permit Posted Pricing (PP): sell the permits separately at price lj that is independent from the seller’s
costs. We consider a specific type of mechanisms in the proof where the item price pj(c) = cj .
• Permit Bundling (PB): sell all the permits as a grand bundle at a price δ that is independent from the
seller’s costs. We consider a specific type of mechanisms in the proof where the item price pj(c) = cj .
More specifically, for PP and PB, we don’t hide items anymore as there is no competition from other
buyers. Denote IP-PROFIT, PP-PROFIT, PB-PROFIT the optimal profit of the above mechanisms.
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3 Paper Organization
In this section, we provide a roadmap for our paper. In Section 4, we introduce a benchmark of the opti-
mal profit using the CDW duality framework. We formulate the maximization problem as an LP, take the
Lagrangian dual (Section 4.1), and then define a new set of dual variables (a flow) to derive our benchmark
(Section 4.2).
In Section 5, we prove our result for the single constraint-additive buyer case. We divide the benchmark
into two terms – MOST-SURPLUS and LESS-SURPLUS – and bound them separately. For MOST-SURPLUS,
we bound it using the sell-items-separately mechanism (Section 5.1). For LESS-SURPLUS, we first construct
an auxiliary revenue maximization problem for selling m items(called the revenue setting). We show that
any mechanism in the auxiliary problem can be turned into a permit-selling mechanism in the original prob-
lem without changing the value of the objective (Lemma 5). Then we point out that in the benchmark of the
optimal revenue in the auxiliary problem, one term is identical to LESS-SURPLUS and can be approximated
by the revenue of selling the items separately or grand bundling. Thus by converting the two mechanisms to
the permit-selling mechanisms, we can bound LESS-SURPLUS using the PS and PB mechanisms.
In Section 6 we study the case with multiple matroid-rank buyers. The benchmark now is divided into
three terms MOST-SURPLUS, PROPHET and LESS-SURPLUS. For MOST-SURPLUS, we bound it using
the Constrained Sequential Item Posted Price mechanism (Section 6.1). For PROPHET, we bound it with
the same class of mechanisms, with the help of Online Contention Resolution Scheme (Section 6.2). In
Section 6.3, the last term LESS-SURPLUS is bounded by both permit-selling mechanisms, using standard
Core-Tail Decomposition technique.
4 Benchmark for the Maximum Profit
In this section, we construct a benchmark for the optimal profit using the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality
framework. Before getting into the framework and benchmark, we first show that the revelation principle
holds in the profit maximization problem. Therefore, it suffices to find a benchmark for the optimal profit
attainable by any direct, BIC, and interim IR mechanisms. The proof is postponed to Appendix B.
Lemma 1. Any ex-post implementable mechanism in the profit maximization problem can be implemented
by a direct, BIC, and interim IR mechanism.
4.1 Duality Framework
The framework is first developed in [7] and is widely used in mechanism design. Here we apply the frame-
work to our profit maximization problem. We obtain an upper bound of the optimal profit similar to the
upper bound of the optimal revenue obtained in [7]. More specifically, the profit of any BIC, interim IR
mechanism is upper bounded by the sum of all buyers’ virtual welfare minus the seller’s total cost for the
same allocation, with respect to some virtual value function. We will only show a sketch of the framework
in the main body and refer the readers to Appendix A for a complete description.
In the framework, we first formulate the profit maximization problem as an LP. Then take the partial
Lagrangian dual of the LP by lagrangifying the BIC and interim IR constraints. Since the buyer’s payment is
unconstrained in the partial Lagrangian, one can argue that to obtain any finite benchmark, the corresponding
dual variables must form a flow. The virtual value function in the benchmark is then defined according to
the choice of the dual variables/flow.
Lemma 2. For any dual solution λ that induces a finite benchmark of the optimal profit and any BIC, interim
IR mechanism M = (x, p),
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PROFIT(M) ≤ E
t,c
[∑
i
pii(ti, c) · (Φ(λ)i (ti)− c)
]
where
Φ
(λ)
i (ti) = ti −
1
fi(ti)
·
∑
t′i∈Ti
λi(t
′
i, ti)(t
′
i − ti)
can be viewed as buyer i’s virtual value function. Here pii(ti, c) = Et−i [xi(ti, t−i, c)] is the interim
allocation. λ(t′i, ti) is the Lagrangian dual variable for the BIC/IR constraint that says when the buyer has
true type t′i she does not want to misreport ti.
4.2 Our Flow
Now we choose the dual variables λ carefully to induce a useful benchmark. First, let us use the single buyer
case to provide some intuition behind our flow.
4.2.1 Single Buyer
In [7] and [9], they cleverly choose the canonical flow in the revenue maximization setting. They divide the
type space T into m regions R1, ..., Rm by finding the largest value tj among all items (called “favorite”
item). It is the item that contributes the most to the buyer’s welfare. Then they let the flow go between two
nodes t, t′ ∈ Rj only if they differs only on the j-th coordinate. However, the same flow does not give us a
useful benchmark in our setting, as the way to divide the type space does not even depend on the information
of the seller’s costs (i.e. the realized cost c or the cost distribution C). In [7], they also analyze another flow
that is considered as a distribution of several canonical flows. We could define our flow similar to theirs: first
for any fixed cost vector c′, divide the region by which item has the largest value ti − c′i and use the above
flow. Next, define our flow as a distribution of the flow for c′, over the randomness of c′. This attempt does
take the cost distribution into account. Unfortunately, this flow does not work as the mechanism constructed
based on the sampled cost c′ will not represent the seller’s true profit based on c.
For single buyer, we introduce the following flow. For every j ∈ [m], let v¯j(tj) = Ec[(tj−cj)+]. Define
every Rj as follows: Rj contains all types t ∈ T such that j is the smallest index among argmaxk v¯k(tk).
We route the flow in a similar manner, that is, there is a flow between two nodes t, t′ ∈ Rj if they only differ
on the j-th coordinate (see Definition 3). Here is the intuition behind our division. Inspired by the canonical
flow, we again want to identify the favorite item for the buyer and divide the regions accordingly. However,
the favorite item now should be defined as the one that contributes the most to the buyer’s utility instead of
the overall welfare. Note that v¯j(tj) = Ec[(tj − cj)+] is exactly the expected utility from item j when the
item price is cj , which is the lowest price that the seller is willing to sell the item. That is why we choose
v¯j(tj) to represent the contribution of item j to the buyer’s utility. Interestingly, the SPS mechanisms are
inspired by our flow, because when there is only one buyer, v¯j(tj) can also be viewed as the buyer’s “value”
for the j-th permit when the item price pj(c) = cj . If we can design a mechanism to extract high revenue
from selling the permits, then we have a mechanism that generates high profit. We will make this intuitive
connection more concrete in Section 5.2.
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4.2.2 Multiple Buyers
Inspired by the single buyer case, we again aim to extract high revenue from selling the permits to make
sure our mechanism generates high profit. When there are multiple buyers in the auction, we sell items
sequentially to the buyers and our mechanism should satisfy the following two properties:
• The item price should be carefully chosen as the item can not be over-allocated. Usually in the
sequential mechanism, the item price should be large enough, to make sure that the item is available
to every buyer when she comes to the auction, with certain probability.
• The item price should be at least the seller’s cost, to make sure the revenue extracted from selling the
items is enough to cover the cost.
Intuitively, how the flow is chosen should also depend on the format of the mechanism we aim to use. To
satisfy both properties, we combine our flow in Section 4.2.1 with the ex-ante relaxation technique purposed
in [13]. [9] uses the same technique to construct the flow. They divide the type space by comparing the
difference between value and the quantile induced from ex-ante allocation probability. Here we involve dif-
ferent quantile thresholds for different cost realization. Furthermore, in order to satisfy the second property,
we choose our threshold as the maximum between the quantile and seller’s cost.
Definition 1. (Ex-ante relaxation) Fix mechanism M(pi, p). For every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] and c ∈ TS , define
qij(c) = 12 · Et[piij(ti, c)], and let
βij(c) = inf {a ≥ 0 : Pr[tij ≥ max{a, cj}] ≤ qij(c)}
βij(c) = 0 if Pr[tij ≥ cj ] ≤ qij(c). If not, for simplicity we assume that there exists βij(c) such
that Pr[tij ≥ βij(c)] = qij(c). This is true for continuous distribution Dij . For discrete distributions, our
results will hold by dealing with a tie-breaking issue. We refer the readers to Section 5.3 of [9] for more
details. In the further proof we will focus on continuous distributions and a same fix will apply for discrete
distributions.
We denote β the mappings from c to βij(c) for all i, j. Before defining the flow, we need the following
definition.
Definition 2. Fix β. For every i, ti and set P ⊆ [m], define
v¯
(β)
i (ti, P ) = Ec
 max
S⊆P,S∈Fi
∑
j∈S
(tj −max{βij(c), cj})

Remark: v¯(β)i (ti, P ) is equal to u¯
p
i (ti, P ) by choosing pij(c) = max{βij(c), cj}.
For notational convenience, let v¯(β)ij (tij) = v¯
(β)
i (ti, {j}) = Ec[(tij −max{βij(c), cj})+]5, which only
depends on tij . It coincides with the definition in Section 4.2.1 with β = 0.
Now we are ready to define our flow for multiple buyer case.
Definition 3. (Our flow) Fix β. For every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], R(β)ij contains all types ti ∈ Ti such that j
is the smallest index among argmaxk v¯
(β)
ik (tik). Define the flow as follows: Each node ti receives flow of
weight fi(ti) from the source. For every node ti, t′i ∈ R(β)ij , λi(t′i, ti) > 0 only if t′ik = tik for all k 6= j,
5For any value x, denote x+ = max{x, 0}
11
Figure 1: An example of our flow for two items.
and t′ij is the predecessor type of tij
6. For node ti = (tij , ti,−j) ∈ R(β)ij , if there does not exist a successor
type t′ij of tij such that (t
′
ij , ti,−j) ∈ R(β)ij , all flow entering node ti goes to the sink ∅. Figure 1 shows an
example of our flow for some buyer i when m = 2. The curve in the graph contains all (ti1, ti2) such that
v¯
(β)
i1 (ti1) = v¯
(β)
i2 (ti2).
Since for all β, i, j, v¯(β)ij (·) is non-decreasing, each region R(β)ij is upward-closed: for every ti =
(tij , ti,−j) ∈ R(β)ij and t′ij > tij , (t′ij , ti,−j) ∈ R(β)ij . With this property, we have the following Lemma
from [7].
Lemma 3. [7] Fix any β. There exists a flow λ such that for every i ∈ [n], ti ∈ R(β)ij ,
Φ
(λ)
ik (ti) =
{
tik, if k 6= j
ϕ˜ij(tij), if k = j
where ϕ˜ij(·) is the Myerson’s ironed virtual value function w.r.t. Dij .
With Lemma 2 and 3, we have obtained a benchmark for any BIC, interim IR mechanism and divide it
into three terms. Note that the benchmark may differ for different mechanisms. The proof of Theorem 4 can
be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 4. For any BIC, interim IR mechanismM , let β be the mapping associated withM in Definition 1,
then
PROFIT(M) ≤
∑
i
E
ti,c
[∑
j
1[ti ∈ R(β)ij ] · piij(ti, c) · (ϕ˜ij(tij)− cj)
]
+ 2 ·
∑
i
∑
j
E
c
[
qij(c) · (max{βij(c), cj} − cj)
]
+
∑
i
E
ti
[∑
j
1[ti ∈ R(β)ij ] · v¯(β)i (ti, [m]\{j})
]
6In other words, t′ij is the smallest value in the support set Tij that is greater than tij .
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We use MOST-SURPLUS(β), PROPHET(β) and LESS-SURPLUS(β) to denote the three terms accord-
ingly. Note that all three terms depend on β. For the rest of the paper we show that these three terms can
be bounded by the profit of simple mechanisms for any β induced by a BIC, interim IR mechanism M . In
fact, to prove an approximation of the optimal profit, it is sufficient to consider one specific β induced by
the optimal mechanism. In the proof, we fix β and omit it in the notation.
5 Warm-up: Single, Constraint-Additive Buyer
In this section, we bound the benchmark for single, constraint-additive buyer. In this case, all βs are set to 0
and thus PROPHET = 0. We will prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5. When n = 1, for any valuation distribution D, cost distribution C and any downward-closed
feasibility constraint F ,
OPTPROFIT ≤ 2 · IP-PROFIT + 5 · PP-PROFIT + 4 · PB-PROFIT
When the buyer’s valuation is additive,
OPTPROFIT ≤ IP-PROFIT + 3 · PP-PROFIT + 2 · PB-PROFIT
Theorem 5 implies that a simple randomization among the three mechanisms achieves at least 111 the
optimal profit for any downward-closed F . And for additive valuations, a randomization among the three
mechanisms is a 6-approximation to the optimal profit.
5.1 Bounding MOST-SURPLUS
To bound MOST-SURPLUS, we will consider the Copies Setting from [11], which is a single-dimensional
setting in the revenue maximization problem. Here is a sketch of the proof. For any fixed cost vector c, we
first focus on a related revenue maximization problem with a single buyer and multiple items, by simply
subtracting the fixed cost c from the buyer’s value t. Next, we show that the optimal revenue in the copies
setting of the related revenue maximization problem is an upper bound of MOST-SURPLUS. According
to [11], there exists a posted price mechanism in the multi-item setting whose revenue approximates the
optimal revenue in its copies setting. Finally, we show an Item Posted Pricing mechanism whose expected
profit is the same as to the expected revenue of the posted price mechanism.
For any fixed c, we will first focus on the following revenue maximization problem with a single buyer
and m items. Buyer has value tj − cj for each item j, where tj is drawn independently from Dj . Since c is
a fixed vector, the buyer’s values are independent across items. The buyer is constraint-additive with respect
to the feasibility constraint F .
The Copies Setting of the above problem is as follows: there arem buyers in the auction andm copies to
sell. Buyer j only interests in the j-th copy and has value tj−cj for it, where tj is drawn independently from
Dj . Since c is a fixed vector, all buyers’ values are also independent. The seller has no cost for the copies
but has a downward-closed constraint F that specifies which copies can simultaneously be sold. Denote
OPT-REVCOPIES(c) the optimal revenue for the copies setting. Since it is a single dimensional setting,
Myerson’s auction achieves the optimal revenue, which equals to the maximum ironed virtual welfare
OPT-REVCOPIES(c) = E
t
[max
S∈F
∑
j∈S
(ϕ˜j(tj)− cj)+].7
7Notice that the ironed Myerson’s virtual value for buyer j is ϕ˜j(tj)− cj .
13
Moreover, let OPT-REVCOPIES-UD(c) be the optimal revenue if we further restrict the seller to sell at most
one copy. Similarly OPT-REVCOPIES-UD(c) = Et[maxj(ϕ˜j(tj)− cj)+]. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 4. MOST-SURPLUS ≤ Evc[OPT-REVCOPIES-UD(c)] ≤ 2 · IP-PROFIT. When the buyer is additive,
we further have MOST-SURPLUS ≤ IP-PROFIT.
Proof. We first prove the result for arbitrary downward-closed constraint F . Notice that for every t, the
indicator 1[t ∈ Rj ] is 1 for only one j. Since pij(t, c) ∈ [0, 1], we have
MOST-SURPLUS = E
t,c
[∑
j
1[t ∈ Rj ] · pij(t, c) · (ϕ˜j(tj)− cj)
]
≤ E
t,c
[
max
j
(ϕ˜j(tj)− cj)+
]
= E
c
[
OPT-REVCOPIES-UD(c)
]
By [11], there exists a posted price mechanism M(c) in the revenue maximization problem whose
revenue is at least 12 OPT-REV
COPIES-UD(c). Let pˆj(c) be the posted price for item j.
Now we move back to our profit maximization setting and define the IP mechanism M ′ as follows: For
every cost vector c, define the posted price for item j as pˆj(c) + cj . Notice that for every t and c, the buyer
in M ′ will purchase the same bundle B∗(t, c) as the one in M(c). Here B∗(t, c) = argmaxS∈F
∑
j∈S(tj −
cj − pˆj(c)). Thus the seller’s profit of M ′ is
E
t,c
[ ∑
j∈B∗(t,c)
(pˆj(c) + cj − cj)
]
= E
t,c
[ ∑
j∈B∗(t,c)
pˆj(c)
]
≥ 1
2
E
c
[
OPT-REVCOPIES-UD(c)
] ≥ 1
2
·MOST-SURPLUS
When the buyer is additive, for any fixed c, it is not hard to realize that OPT-REVCOPIES(c) equals to the
revenue of selling each item separately using the monopoly reserve in the revenue maximization problem.
Let pˆj(c) be the monopoly reserve for item j in the revenue maximization problem. Following the same
proof as above, the IP mechanism M ′ with price pˆj(c) + cj achieves expected profit at least
E
c
[OPT-REVCOPIES(c)] = E
t,c
[∑
j
(ϕ˜j(tj)− cj)+
]
≥ E
t,c
[∑
j
1[t ∈ Rj ] · pij(t, c) · (ϕ˜j(tj)− cj)
]
= MOST-SURPLUS
5.2 Bounding LESS-SURPLUS
Before bounding LESS-SURPLUS, we will first prove a crucial lemma of this section. Consider the revenue
maximization problem with a single buyer andm items. The buyer’s type t ∼ D. She has valuation function
v¯(t, ·) when her type is t. For simplicity, we will call this revenue maximization problem the revenue setting,
and the original profit maximization problem the profit setting. Recall that in the single buyer case,
v¯(t, P ) = E
c
[
max
S⊆P,S∈F
∑
j∈S
(tj − cj)
]
14
The following lemma converts any truthful mechanism in the revenue setting into a BIC and interim IR
mechanism in the profit setting, without changing the value of the objective (revenue and profit accordingly).
The intuition behind the lemma is as follows. For any mechanism in the profit setting that sells the permit
before revealing her true cost, the buyer with type t has expected “value” v¯(t, P ), that is, how much the buyer
can make from the second stage if given a set of permits P , for all set of permits P . Thus, the mechanism
can be viewed as a corresponding mechanism in the revenue setting where the permits are being sold and
the buyer has valuation v¯ over the permits.
Lemma 5. For any truthful mechanism M in the revenue setting, there exists an IC and IR mechanism M ′
in the profit setting such that, the revenue of M equals to the seller’s profit of M ′.
Proof. For any t, let X(t) be the (possibly random) set of items that the buyer is allocated in mechanism
M , when the buyer reports t. Let p(t) be the payment for the buyer in M . Define M ′ as follows: in the first
stage, the buyer reports her type t and the seller gives the set of permits X(t) to the buyer and charge p(t).
In the second stage, the seller reveals the cost vector c and the buyer can buy any item that she has a permit
by paying item price cj . To prove M ′ is an IC and IR mechanism, it suffices to show that the buyer has no
incentive to lie in the first stage. If the buyer with type t reports t′ in M ′, she will receive the set of permits
X(t′) and purchase her favorite bundle of items under item prices c. Her expected utility is
E
c,X(t′)
[
max
S∈F ,S⊆X(t′)
∑
j∈S
(tj − cj)
]− p(t′) = E
X(t′)
[v¯(t, X(t′))]− p(t′)
Here the expectation is taken over the randomness of X(t′). Since M is truthful, for any t ∈ T, t′ ∈
T+ 8, EX(t)[v¯(t, X(t))]−p(t) ≥ EX(t′)[v¯(t, X(t′))]−p(t′). It states that when the buyer has type t, reporting
t in the first stage maximizes her expected utility. Thus M ′ is IC and IR. Notice that in the second stage of
M ′, the total item prices paid by the buyer is equal to the seller’s total cost. Thus the seller’s profit is exactly
the payment in the first stage. Since M ′ use p(t) as the payment rule, the seller’s profit of M ′ equals to the
revenue of M .
Now we are ready to bound the term LESS-SURPLUS. Recall that
LESS-SURPLUS = E
t
[∑
j
1[t ∈ Rj ] · v¯(t, [n]\{j})
]
.
Consider the revenue setting where the buyer has valuation function v¯ and let OPTREV(v¯) be the optimal
revenue among all truthful mechanisms. Here we omit D and C in the notation as they are fixed. Given
Lemma 5, it is tempting to find a simple mechanism that approximates OPTREV(v¯) and convert it into a
permit-selling mechanism. However, since we do not know what class of valuation v¯ belongs to, it not
a priori clear any simple vs. optimal result applies here. As the original valuation in the profit setting is
constrained additive, it is natural to think that v¯ is also constrained additive. Unfortunately, we are not able
to prove such a claim as there is no clear feasibility that is associated with v¯. The good news is that we are
able to relax the class of valuations and show that v¯ is indeed a subadditive function, which allows us to
leverage the result by [29, 9].
Let us first review their results. They bound OPTREV(v¯) when v¯ is subadditive over independent items
(see Definition 4). In both proofs, they separate the benchmark of the optimal revenue into two terms (called
“single” and “non-favorite” in [9]). They then bound the two terms by the optimal revenue of the Selling
8Recall that T+ = T ∪ {∅} contains the choice of not attending the auction.
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Separately mechanism(SREV(v¯)) and Bundling mechanism(BREV(v¯)) respectively. The second term “non-
favorite” is defined as the expected welfare from all non-favorite items. Here for any fixed t, the favorite
item is defined as the j that maximizes v¯(t, {j}). Interestingly, this is how we divide the region into Rjs
and the term “non-favorite” is exactly the same as LESS-SURPLUS. We will use NON-FAVREV(v¯) to denote
“non-favorite” here to emphasize that it is from the revenue setting.
In order to apply the result in the revenue setting, we first show that the function v¯(·, ·) in Definition 2 is
indeed subadditive over independent items. The proof of Lemma 6 is postponed to Appendix C.
Definition 4. [29] Suppose the buyer’s type t is drawn from a product distribution D =
∏
j Dj , her
distribution V of valuation function v(t, ·) is subadditive over independent items if:
• v(·, ·) has no externalities, i.e., for each t ∈ T and S ⊆ [m], v(t, S) only depends on 〈tj〉j∈S ,
formally, for any t′ ∈ T such that t′j = tj for all j ∈ S, v(t′, S) = v(t, S).
• v(·, ·) is monotone, i.e., for all t ∈ T and U ⊆ V ⊆ [m], v(t, U) ≤ v(t, V ).
• v(·, ·) is subadditive, i.e., for all t ∈ T and U, V ⊆ [m], v(t, U ∪ V ) ≤ v(t, U) + v(t, V ).
Lemma 6. v¯(·, ·) is monotone, subadditive and has no externalities.
Lemma 7. [9] Suppose v¯ is subadditive over independent items, then
NON-FAVREV(v¯) = Et
[∑
j
1[t ∈ Rj ] · v¯(t, [n]\{j})
] ≤ 5 · SREV(v¯) + 4 · BREV(v¯)
We only provide a sketch of their analysis here and refer the readers to their paper for a formal proof.
They first use the Core-Tail Decomposition technique and divide NON-FAVREV(v¯) into two terms TAIL(v¯)
and CORE(v¯). The term TAIL(v¯) can be bounded using SREV(v¯).CORE(v¯) can be viewed as the buyer’s
expected welfare under a truncated valuation. They show that the welfare concentrates via a concentration
inequality for subadditive functions[30]. In particular, they show that the median of the welfare is compara-
ble to the mean of the welfare. Thus, a grand bundling mechanism that uses the median as the price is able
to approximate CORE(v¯).
When the buyer is additive, [7] has an improved bound for NON-FAVREV(v¯) using SREV(v¯) and BREV(v¯).
Lemma 8. [7] If v¯ is an additive function, then
NON-FAVREV(v¯) ≤ 2 · SREV(v¯) + 3 · BREV(v¯)
By Lemma 5, the Selling Separately mechanism in the revenue setting can be converted to the PP
mechanism in the profit setting and has profit equals to SREV(v¯). Also the Bundling mechanism can be
converted to PB and obtains profit BREV(v¯). Furthermore, when the buyer is additive, there is no constraint
F and for every t ∈ T, P ⊆ [m],
v¯(t, P ) = E
c
[
max
S⊆P
∑
j∈S
(tj − cj)
]
= E
c
[∑
j∈P
(tj − cj)+
]
=
∑
j∈P
v¯(t, {j}).
Thus, v¯ is an additive function. We have the following Corollary:
Corollary 1. LESS-SURPLUS ≤ 5·PP-PROFIT+4·PB-PROFIT. When the buyer is additive, LESS-SURPLUS ≤
2 · PP-PROFIT + 3 · PB-PROFIT.
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Proof of Theorem 5: It follows from Theorem 4, Lemma 4 and Corollary 1. 2
At the last of this section, we will prove the following lemma that connects the profit maximization
problem to the revenue maximization problem. We show that any truthful mechanism in the revenue setting
that is an α-approximation to the optimal revenue can be converted to a BIC and interim IR mechanism in
the profit setting that is a (9α+ 2)-approximation to the optimal profit.
Lemma 9. Recall that the revenue setting is the revenue maximization problem where the buyer has val-
uation v¯. Then any truthful mechanism in the revenue setting that is an α-approximation to the optimal
revenue OPTREV(v¯) can be converted to an IC and IR mechanism in the profit setting that is a (9α + 2)-
approximation to the optimal profit OPTPROFIT.
Proof. By Lemma [9],
NON-FAVREV(v¯) ≤ 5 · SREV(v¯) + 4 · BREV(v¯) ≤ 9 · OPTREV(v¯)
Let M be the α-approximation mechanism in the revenue setting. Then the revenue of M satisfies:
REV(M) ≥ 1
α
· OPTREV(v¯) ≥ 1
9α
· NON-FAVREV(v¯)
By Lemma 5, there exists a BIC and interim IR mechanismM ′ in the profit setting such that PROFIT(M ′) =
REV(M). Notice that LESS-SURPLUS = NON-FAVREV(v¯). By Theorem 4,
OPTPROFIT ≤ MOST-SURPLUS + LESS-SURPLUS ≤ 2 · IP-PROFIT + 9α · PROFIT(M ′)
Thus a randomization between M ′ and the optimal Item Posted Pricing mechanism is a (9α + 2)-
approximation.
6 Multiple, Matroid-Rank Buyers
In this section, we will bound the benchmark in Theorem 4 for multiple, matroid-rank buyers, using the
mechanisms described in Section 2.
Theorem 6. For any valuation distribution D, cost distribution C and any matroid feasibility constraints
{Fi}mi=1,
OPTPROFIT ≤ 14 · CSIP-PROFIT + 22 · RSPP-PROFIT + 8 · SPB-PROFIT
Again a simple randomization among the three mechanisms achieves at least 144 the optimal profit.
6.1 Bounding MOST-SURPLUS
Similar to the single buyer case, for every fixed vector c, we consider the related revenue maximization
problem where every buyer i has value tij − cj for item j. The corresponding Copies Setting is a rev-
enue maximization problem with mn buyers and m items. Every buyer (i, j) only interests in item j and
has value tij − cj on it. For every i, at most one (i, j) can be served in the mechanism. We denote
OPT-REVCOPIES-UD(c) the optimal revenue of this setting. In Lemma 10 we first bound MOST-SURPLUS
by Ec[OPT-REVCOPIES-UD(c)]. Then according to [11], OPT-REVCOPIES-UD(c) can be approximated by the
revenue of the optimal sequential posted price mechanism in the related revenue maximization setting. As-
sume the posted price for buyer i and item j is pˆij(c). We show that in our setting, an SIP mechanism with
pij(c) = pˆij(c) + cj has profit the same as the expected (over the randomness of c) revenue of the above
sequential posted price mechanism.
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Lemma 10. MOST-SURPLUS ≤ Ec[OPT-REVCOPIES-UD(c)] ≤ 6 · CSIP-PROFIT.
Proof. Recall that
MOST-SURPLUS =
∑
i
E
ti,c
[∑
j
1[ti ∈ R(β)ij ] · piij(ti, c) · (ϕ˜ij(tij)− cj)
]
For every BIC, interim IR mechanism M = (pi, p) and every c, consider the following mechanism M ′
in the Copies Setting: M ′ serves agent (i, j) if and only if M allocates item j to buyer i and ti ∈ R(β)ij .
Since M is feasible, for every j there exist at most one i such that (i, j) is served in M ′. Also since every ti
stays in one region, for every i there exists at most one j such that (i, j) is served inM ′. ThusM ′ is feasible
and the expected revenue equals to
∑
i Eti
[∑
j 1[ti ∈ R(β)ij ] · piij(ti, c) · (ϕ˜ij(tij)− cj)
]
. Thus we have
MOST-SURPLUS ≤ E
c
[OPT-REVCOPIES-UD(c)]
By [11], for every c there exists a sequential posted price mechanism M(c) in the related revenue
maximization setting9, where every buyer can purchase at most one item, such that its revenue is at least
OPT-REVCOPIES-UD(c)/6. Suppose the posted price for buyer i and item j is pˆij(c). Now let’s consider the
Constrained Sequential Item Posted Price mechanism with pij(c) = pˆij(c) + cj in our profit maximization
setting, where every buyer is only allowed to purchase at most one item. For every t, c, let Ai(t<i, c)
be the remaining item sets when buyer i comes to the auction. Then she will choose her favorite item
argmaxj∈Ai(t<i,c)(tij − cj − pˆij(c)) (or choose not to purchase anything). Notice that this is also buyer i’s
favorite item in M(c) under the same scenario. Thus the allocation rule for CSIP under c is the same as
the one for M(c). Then profit of the constructed CSIP is equal to the expected revenue of M(c) over the
randomness of c, as the extra item prices just cover the seller’s costs. According to [11], the profit is at least
Ec[OPT-REVCOPIES-UD(c)]/6. The proof is done.
6.2 Bounding PROPHET
In this section we will bound PROPHET with a Constrained Sequential Item Posted Price mechanism. The
proof uses Online Contention Resolution Scheme(OCRS) developed by Feldman et al. [23]. It is defined
under an online selection problem. For simplicity, we will just describe the setting considered in our proof.
Each element e in an ground set is revealed one by one, and an agent has to make a decision whether to take
an element before the next one is revealed. In our proof the ground set is J , the set containing all buyer-item
pairs. And each element e = (i, j) is one of the buyer-item pair. The agent can only take a feasible set of
elements subject to the feasibility constraint J . The set of active elements is random, and the agent can only
take the active elements. Let R(y) be the random set of active elements, where vector y = (ye)e∈J . For
each e ∈ J , each element is chosen as active or inactive independently and ye is the probability of e being
active. y stays in the polytope PJ corresponding to J :
PJ = conv({1A|A ∈ J })
An OCRS for PJ is an online algorithm that selects a feasible and active set: A ⊆ R(y) and A ∈ J .
Specifically, a greedy OCRS Π uses a greedy scheme during the selection: for each y ∈ PJ , it determines
a subfamily JΠ,y ⊆ J . It selects an element e when e arrives if, the set of elements selected still stays in
JΠ,y after picking e.
In the proof we will mainly consider the following property of a greedy OCRS Π called selectability. It
is first defined in [23].
9Recall that in this setting every buyer i has value tij − cj for item j.
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Definition 5. [23] Let b, c ∈ [0, 1]. A greedy OCRS Π is (b, c)-selectable if for every y ∈ b · PJ , e ∈ J
Pr[A ∪ {e} ∈ JΠ,y,∀A ⊆ R(y), A ∈ JΠ,y] ≥ c.
The above definition can be described as follows. With probability at least c, over the randomness of
R(y), for any subset A of the active elements that is feasible w.r.t. the subfamily JΠ,y, we can add element
e to the set without violating the feasibility. ViewA as the set of elements being served by the greedy OCRS
Π. When e arrives, (b, c)-selectability guarantees that not matter what set of elements has been chosen
already (still a subset of A), with probability at least c, adding element e is still feasible. By Definition 5,
one can show that by following the OCRS, the agent will select each element ewith probability at least c ·ye,
under any almighty adversary10.
Lemma 11. ([23]) Consider the online selection setting described above. If there exists a (b, c)-selectable
greedy OCRS Π for PJ , then for every y ∈ b · PJ , consider the strategy that the agent takes elements
greedily subject to the sub-constraint JΠ,y. Then the agent will select each element e with probability at
least c · ye. The result applies for any almighty adversary.
Before getting to the proof, let’s first discuss the connection between OCRS and bounding PROPHET.
Recall that
PROPHET = 2 ·
∑
i
∑
j
E
c
[
qij(c) · (max{βij(c), cj} − cj)
]
Fix c. For every (i, j) ∈ J , let y(i,j) = qij(c). Since qij(c) is half the ex-ante probability that a feasible
mechanism M serves the pair (i, j) when the true cost is c, thus y = (y(i,j))(i,j)∈J ∈ 12 · J . Now consider
the CSIP with item prices max{βij(c), cj}. Then by Definition 1, each buyer i can afford item j with
probability qij(c)11, i.e. the element (i, j) is active with probability qij(c). In Lemma 12 we show that for
one specific almighty adversary, the set of element (i, j) chosen by the agent following the greedy OCRS
is exactly same as the set of buyer-item pair served in the mechanism, for every type profile. Then (b, c)-
selectability guarantees that every buyer i will purchase every item j in the mechanism with probability at
least c given the fact that she can afford this item. This gives a lower bound of CSIP-PROFIT.
Lemma 12. Fix seller’s cost vector c. Suppose there exists a (b, c)-selectable greedy OCRS Π for polytope
P (J ), for some constant c ∈ (0, 1). For every lijs such that l ∈ b · P (J ), consider the CSIP under the
specific cost profile c, with posted price pij(c) = F−1ij (1− lij) and sub-constraint JΠ,l. Then the mechanism
will gain profit at least
c ·
∑
i,j
lij · (pij(c)− cj)
under cost c.
Proof. Under cost c, consider the CSIP with posted price pij(c), associated with the constraint JΠ,y. When
every buyer i comes, let Ai be the set of buyer-item pairs that have already been served. And let B∗i be her
favorite bundle among the remaining items, such that after taking those items, the sub-constraint JΠ,y is not
violated. Now consider the online selection setting with the following almighty adversary: Ground set is
10The adversary can determine the order of elements shown to the agent. An almighty adversary has all the information it needs
to decide the order, including the agent’s type and strategies, and the realization of all possible randomness. In other words, the
adversary will choose the worst order for the agent.
11It’s true when βij(c) ≥ cj . For those (i, j) such that βij(c) < cj , the corresponding term in PROPHET is 0. We could simply
never serve those pairs.
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J . The agent has value tij for each element (i, j). Each element (i, j) is active if ti ≥ pij(c), i.e. is active
with probability lij . The adversary divides the whole item-revealing process into n stages. For each stage i,
let Bi be the set of elements that have been selected in the past. The adversary first reveals all (i, j)s where
j ∈ B∗i , one after another. Then it reveals the remaining (i, j)s.
Notice that by following the greedy OCRS Π, the agent will follow the constraint JΠ,l and choose all
the element (i, j) where j ∈ B∗i on each stage, as taking those elements won’t violate the constraint by the
definition of B∗i . It’s equivalent to the buyer-item pair selection process in the CSIP. Thus under the above
adversary, the set of element (i, j) chosen by the agent is exactly same as the set of buyer-item pair served
in the mechanism. Since each element (i, j) is active with probability lij and l ∈ b · P (J ), by Lemma 11,
each element is chosen by the agent with probability at least c · lij . In other words, in CSIP, each buyer i
purchases item j with probability at least c · lij , under cost c. Thus the obtained profit is at least
c ·
∑
i,j
lij · (pij − cj)
Now it’s sufficient to show that there exists a (12 , c)-selectable greedy OCRS Π for PJ . Recall that every
A ∈ J satisfies:
• Each item is allocated to at most one buyer: ∀j,Oj = {i : (i, j) ∈ A}, |Oj | ≤ 1.
• Each buyer is allocated a feasible set of items: ∀i, Pi = {j : (i, j) ∈ A}, Pi ∈ Fi.
Let J1(or J2) be the subfamily that contains all set A that satisfies the first(or second) bullet point. It’s
straightforward to see that J1 forms a partition matroid. We will show that J2 is also a matroid, given the
fact that every Fi is a matroid.
Lemma 13. J2 is a matroid.
Proof. Consider any A,A′ ∈ J2 such that |A| > |A′|. For every i, let Pi = {j : (i, j) ∈ A} and
P ′i = {j : (i, j) ∈ A′}. We have Pi ∈ P ′i ∈ Fi. Notice that |A| =
∑
i |Pi| > |A′| =
∑
i |P ′i |, there
must exist i0 such that |Pi0 | > |P ′i0 |. Since Fi0 is a matroid, there exists some j0 ∈ Pi0\P ′i0 such that
P ′i0 ∪ {j0} ∈ Fi0 . By definition of J2, we also have (i0, j0) ∈ A\A′ and A′ ∪ (i0, j0) ∈ J2. Thus J2 is a
matroid.
Note that J = J1 ∩ J2. J is an intersection of two matroids. We can show that there exists a (12 , 14)-
selectable greedy OCRS for P (J ) by the following two facts from [23].
Lemma 14. ([23])For every b ∈ [0, 1], there exists a (b, 1 − b)-selectable greedy OCRS for matroid poly-
topes.
Lemma 15. ([23])Suppose there exists a (b, c1)-selectable greedy OCRS for P (J1) and a (b, c2)-selectable
greedy OCRS for P (J2). Then there exists a (b, c1 · c2)-selectable greedy OCRS for P (J1) ∩ P (J2).
Moreover, since P (J1 ∩ J2) ⊆ P (J1) ∩ P (J2), there exists a (b, c1 · c2)-selectable greedy OCRS for
P (J1 ∩ J2).
Put everything together, we are able to bound PROPHET using CSIP-PROFIT.
Lemma 16. PROPHET ≤ 8 · CSIP-PROFIT.
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Proof. First for those (i, j) such that βij(c) < cj , the corresponding term in PROPHET is 0. We could
simply never serve those pairs. Thus without loss of generality, we assume that βij(c) ≥ cj for every
(i, j). For every c, since qij(c) is half the ex-ante probability that a feasible mechanism M serves the pair
(i, j) when the true cost is c, thus q(c) = (qij(c))(i,j)∈J ∈ 12 · J . By Lemma 14 and 15, there exists
a (12 ,
1
4)-selectable greedy OCRS Π for P (J ). We thus consider the CSIP with posted price pij(c) =
max{βij(c), cj}, associated with the constraint JΠ,q(c). By Lemma 12, the profit of the mechanism is at
least
1
4
·
∑
i
∑
j
E
c
[
qij(c) · (max{βij(c), cj} − cj)
]
6.3 Bounding LESS-SURPLUS
In this Section we will bound LESS-SURPLUS. As discussed in Section 4, we will fix β and omit it in the
notation. We first give an informal proof by reducing the multiple buyer problem to single buyer problems
with a new valuation v¯i in Definition 2. This shows a connection to the single buyer setting as well as the
ex-ante relaxation by Chawla and Miller[13]. In their paper they solve the revenue maximization problem
for multiple matroid-rank buyers, bounding the benchmark by the sum of optimal revenue for the single
buyer problem under an ex-ante constraint.
Recall that
LESS-SURPLUS =
∑
i
E
ti
[∑
j
1[ti ∈ Rij ] · v¯i(ti, [m]\{j})
]
This is the sum of all buyer’s welfare contributed by those non-favorite “items”12, under a new valuation
v¯i. Consider the Sequential Permit Selling mechanism with posted price pij(c) = max{βij(c), cj}. Since
pij(c) ≥ cj for every c, the profit of the mechanism will be at least the revenue extracted from the permit
copies.
Notice that for every i, j, c, buyer i can afford the item price for j with probability qij(c). Thus by union
bound, each item j is still available when buyer i comes with probability at least 1 −∑j qij(c) ≥ 12 . By
Lemma 23, buyer i’s expected utility in the second stage after purchasing a set of permit copies P , is at
least 12 · v¯i(ti, P ). Now we have reduced the multiple buyer problem to n single buyer problems where
buyer i has valuation v¯i(·, ·) for the set of permit copies. Thus from Section 5, the term Eti
[∑
j 1[ti ∈
Rij ] · v¯i(ti, [m]\{j})
]
can be extracted from selling the permit copies separately and as a whole bundle.
The above argument doesn’t give a formal proof because the buyer’s expected utility on the copies
does not exactly equal to 12 · v¯i(ti, P ) and thus a reduction like Lemma 5 cannot be directly obtained.
Now we provide a formal and separate proof, bounding LESS-SURPLUS with RSPP and SPB mechanisms.
First we decompose the term using a standard Core-Tail decomposition technique [28, 7], according to
v¯ij(tij). For every i ∈ [n], define τi = inf{a ≥ 0 :
∑
j Prtij [v¯ij(tij) ≥ a] ≤ 12}. For every ti, let
Ci(ti) = {j ∈ [m] : v¯ij(tij) ≤ τi}.
12Here we use quotations on the word ‘item’ as in the corresponding single buyer problem, the goods sold to the buyers are
permits, not real items.
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Lemma 17.
LESS-SURPLUS ≤
∑
i
∑
j
E
tij :v¯ij(tij)>τi
[v¯ij(tij) · Pr
ti,−j
[∃k 6= j s.t. v¯ik(tik) ≥ v¯ij(tij)]] (TAIL)
+
∑
i
E
ti
[v¯i(ti, Ci(ti))] (CORE)
Proof.
LESS-SURPLUS =
∑
i
E
ti
[∑
j
1[ti ∈ Rij ] · v¯i(ti, [m]\{j})
]
≤
∑
i
E
ti
[∑
j
1[ti ∈ Rij ] · (v¯i(ti, Ci(ti)\{j}) + v¯i(ti, [m]\{j}\Ci(ti)))
]
≤
∑
i
E
ti
[v¯i(ti, Ci(ti))] +
∑
i
E
ti
[∑
j
1[ti ∈ Rij ] ·
∑
k∈[m]\{j}\Ci(ti)
v¯ik(tik)
]
=
∑
i
E
ti
[v¯i(ti, Ci(ti))] +
∑
i
∑
k
E
tik:v¯ik(tik)>τi
[v¯ik(tik) · Pr
ti,−k
[(tik, ti,−k) 6∈ Rij ]]
= CORE + TAIL
6.3.1 TAIL
We will bound TAIL using RSPP mechanisms. For every i, j, let rij = maxa≥τi a · Prtij [v¯ij(tij) ≥ a],
which is the optimal revenue from selling permit j to buyer i. Let r =
∑
i
∑
j rij . We first show that
TAIL ≤ 12 · r and then bound r using a RSPP.
Lemma 18. TAIL ≤ 12 · r.
Proof.
TAIL =
∑
i
∑
j
E
tij :v¯ij(tij)>τi
[v¯ij(tij) · Pr
ti,−j
[∃k 6= j s.t. v¯ik(tik) ≥ v¯ij(tij)]]
≤
∑
i
∑
j
E
tij :v¯ij(tij)>τi
[
v¯ij(tij) ·
∑
k 6=j
Pr
tik
[v¯ik(tik) ≥ v¯ij(tij)]
]
≤
∑
i
∑
j
E
tij :v¯ij(tij)>τi
[∑
k 6=j
rik
]
≤
∑
i
∑
j
Pr
tij
[v¯ij(tij) > τi] · ri
=
1
2
· r
The following lemma bounds r using the RSPP.
Lemma 19. For any positive {ξij}i,j such that
∑
j Prtij [v¯ij(tij) ≥ ξij ] ≤ 12 , we have∑
i
∑
j
ξij · Pr
tij
[v¯ij(tij) ≥ ξij ] ≤ 4 · RSPP-PROFIT
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Proof. Consider the RSPP mechanism with permit price 12ξij and item price max{βij(c), cj}. Notice that
for every buyer i, her expected utility for purchasing each permit j is 12 · v¯ij(tij). She will purchase every
permit j for sure if both of the events happen:
1. She is willing to purchase permit j, i.e., v¯ij(tij) ≥ ξij .
2. She is not willing to purchase other permits, i.e., v¯ik(tik) < ξik,∀k 6= j.
(1) happens with probability Pr[v¯ij(tij) ≥ ξij ]; By union bound, (2) happens with probability at least 12
as
∑
j Prtij [v¯ij(tij) ≥ ξij ] ≤ 12 . Furthermore, both events are independent and thus buyer i will purchase
permit j and pay the permit price with probability at least 12 · Prtij [v¯ij(tij) ≥ ξij ].
We point out that in the above lemma, it’s necessary to make every buyer i’s expected utility for pur-
chasing each permit j to be exactly 12 · v¯ij(tij). This is the reason the RSPP mechanism needs to hide each
item randomly to make each item available with probability exactly 12 (See Section 2). If the mechanism
doesn’t hide the item, we only know that her expected utility for each permit is at least that much. We are
not able to lower bound the probability that (2) happens using union bound.
Lemma 20. TAIL ≤ 2 · RSPP-PROFIT.
Proof. It directly follows from Lemma 18 and 19 by applying argmaxa≥τi a · Prtij [v¯ij(tij) ≥ a] as ξij
(Notice that it satisfies the constraint in Lemma 19 by the definition of τi).
6.3.2 CORE
In this section we bound CORE using RSPP and SPB.
Theorem 7. CORE ≤ 8 · SPB-PROFIT + 20 · RSPP-PROFIT.
Recall that CORE =
∑
i Eti [v¯i(ti, Ci(ti))]. In the proof we will consider the SPB mechanism with item
prices max{βij(c), cj} and permit bundle price δi = 12 · medianti(v¯i(ti, Ci(ti))). In order to show that
each buyer will accept this bundle price with at least half probability, we will prove the expected utility for
the item-purchasing stage is at least 12 · v¯i(ti, [m]). We need the following definition.
Definition 6. Consider the above SPB mechanism. For every i, ti, c and P ⊆ [m], let
ui(ti, c, P ) = max
S⊆P,S∈Fi
∑
j∈S
(tij −max{βij(c), cj})
By Definition 6, buyer i’s expected utility for the item purchasing stage is Et<i,c[ui(ti, c, Si(t<i, c))].
Recall that Si(t<i, c) is the set of available items in the above SPB mechanism. We notice that for every
i, j, c, buyer i can afford the item price for j with probability qij(c). Thus by union bound, each item j is still
available when buyer i comes with probability at least 1 −∑j qij(c) ≥ 12 , i.e. Prt<i [j ∈ Si(t<i, c)] ≥ 12 .
Then by showing that all uis are XOS valuations, we prove that every buyer has expected utility at least
1
2 · v¯i(ti, [m]) to enter the auction.
Definition 7. A function v : 2[m] → R+ is XOS(or fractionally-subadditive) if for every S ⊆ [m], v(S) =
maxk∈[K] v(k)(S) for some finite K and additive functions v(k)(·).
Lemma 21. ([19]) A function v(·) is XOS if and only if for every S ⊆ [m], there exist prices {pj}j∈S (called
supporting prices) such that
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• v(S′) ≥∑j∈S′ pj for all S′ ⊆ S.
• ∑j∈S pj ≥ v(S).
Lemma 22. For every i, ti, c, ui(ti, c, ·) is an XOS function.
Proof. Fix i, ti, c. For every P ⊆ [m], let S∗ = argmaxS⊆P,S∈Fi
∑
j∈S(tij − max{βij(c), cj}). Define
supporting prices for set P as follows: pPj = (tij −max{βij(c), cj}) ·1[j ∈ S∗]. It’s easy to check that pPj s
satisfy both constraints in Lemma 7. Thus ui(ti, c, ·) is an XOS function.
Lemma 23. Consider the above SPB mechanism. For every i, buyer i will accept the bundle price δi with
at least 12 probability.
Proof. As stated above, for every buyer i with type ti, her expected utility on the item-purchasing stage is
Et<i,c[ui(ti, c, Si(t<i, c))]. For every i, j, c, buyer i can afford the item price for j with probability qij(c).
Thus by union bound, Prt<i [j ∈ Si(t<i, c)] ≥ 1−
∑
j qij(c) ≥ 12 .
By Lemma 21 and 22, let pPj (ti, c) be the supporting price for ui(ti, c, ·) and set P . We have
E
t<i,c
[ui(ti, c, Si(t<i, c))] ≥ E
t<i,c
[ ∑
j∈Si(t<i,c)
p
[m]
j (ti, c)
]
= E
c
[ ∑
j∈[m]
p
[m]
j (ti, c) · Prt<i[j ∈ Si(t<i, c)]
]
≥ 1
2
· E
c
[ui(ti, c, [m])] =
1
2
v¯i(ti, [m]) ≥ 1
2
· v¯i(ti, Ci(ti))
Thus buyer i will pay δi = 12 ·medianti(v¯i(ti, Ci(ti))) with probability at least 12 .
Now it’s sufficient to show that Eti [v¯i(ti, Ci(ti))] is comparable to δi for every i. This is obtained
by applying the Talagrands concentration inequality on v¯i(ti, Ci(ti)). Let µi(ti, S) = v¯i(ti, Ci(ti) ∩ S).
We show that µi is subadditive and has small Lipschitz constant. The proof is Lemma 24 is postponed to
Appendix D.
Definition 8. A function v(·, ·) is a-Lipschitz if for any type t, t′ ∈ T , and set X,Y ⊆ [m],∣∣v(t,X)− v(t′, Y )∣∣ ≤ a · (|X∆Y |+ ∣∣{j ∈ X ∩ Y : tj 6= t′j}∣∣) ,
where X∆Y = (X\Y ) ∪ (Y \X) is the symmetric difference between X and Y .
Lemma 24. µi(ti, ·) is monotone, subadditive, no exteralities and has Lipschitz constant τi.
Lemma 25. [30] Let g(t, ·) with t ∼ D = ∏j Dj be a function drawn from a distribution that is subadditive
over independent items of ground set I . If g(·, ·) is c-Lipschitz, then for all a > 0, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |I|}, q ∈ N,
Pr
t
[g(t, I) ≥ (q + 1)a+ k · c] ≤ Pr
t
[g(t, I) ≤ a]−qq−k.
The following corollary comes from [9]. It’s a corollary of Lemma 25. It shows that for every i,
Eti [v¯i(ti, Ci(ti))] is bounded by δi and the Lipschitz constant τi.
Corollary 2. [9]
E
ti
[v¯i(ti, Ci(ti))] = E
ti
[µi(ti, [m]) ≤ 4 · δi + 5
2
· τi
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For the last step,
∑
i τi can be bounded using the RSPP.
Lemma 26.
∑
i τi ≤ 8 · RSPP-PROFIT.
Proof. By definition,
∑
j Prtij [v¯ij(tij) ≥ τi] = 12 for every i. By Lemma 19,
RSPP-PROFIT ≥ 1
4
∑
i
τi ·
∑
j
Pr
tij
[v¯ij(tij) ≥ τi] = 1
8
·
∑
i
τi
Proof of Theorem 7: Consider the SPB mechanism with item prices max{βij(c), cj} and permit bundle
price δi = 12 ·medianti(v¯i(ti, Ci(ti))). According to Lemma 23, 26 and Corollary 2,
SPB-PROFIT ≥ 1
2
·
∑
i
δi ≥ 1
8
(
∑
i
E
ti
[v¯i(ti, Ci(ti))]− 5
2
τi) ≥ 1
8
· (CORE − 20 · RSPP-PROFIT)
2
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A Duality Framework
The seller aims to maximize her profit among all direct, BIC, and interim IR mechanisms. This maximization
problem can be captured by the following LP (see Figure 2). Here we use type ∅ to represent the choice of
not participating in the mechanism. Now the IR constraint can be described as another BIC constraint that
the buyer won’t report type ∅. Let T+i = Ti ∪ {∅}.
Variables:
• pii(ti, c), for all i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti, c ∈ TS , denotes the interim probability vector that buyer i with type
ti receives each item, when the seller has cost c.
• pi(ti, c), for all i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti, c ∈ TS , denoting the buyer i’s interim payment when she has type ti
and the seller has cost c.
Constraints:
• Ec[ti ·pii(ti, c)− pi(ti, c)] ≥ Ec[ti ·pii(t′i, c)− pi(t′i, c)], for all i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti, t′i ∈ T+i , guaranteeing
that the mechanism is BIC and interim IR.
• pi ∈ P ({Fi}ni=1), guaranteeing the allocation is implementable.
Objective:
• max∑i Eti,c[pi(ti, c)− c · pii(ti, c)], the expected seller’s profit.
Figure 2: A Linear Program (LP) for Maximizing Profit.
We then take the partial Lagrangian dual of the LP in Figure 2 by lagrangifying the BIC and interim IR
constraints. Let λi(t, t′) be the Lagrangian multiplier. The dual problem is described in Figure 3.
Variables:
• pii(ti, c) and pi(ti, c).
• λi(t, t′) for all i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti, t′i ∈ T+i , the Lagrangian multiplier for buyer i’s BIC and interim IR
constraints.
Constraints:
• λi(t, t′) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti, t′i ∈ T+i .
• pi ∈ P ({Fi}ni=1).
Objective:
• minλ maxpi,p L(λ, pi, p).
Figure 3: Partial Lagrangian of the LP for Maximizing Profit.
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L(λ, pi, p)
=
∑
i
E
ti,c
[pi(ti, c)− c · pii(ti, c)]
+
∑
i
∑
ti,t′i
λi(ti, t
′
i) · Ec [(ti · pii(ti, c)− pi(ti, c))− (ti · pii(t
′
i, c)− pi(t′i, c))]
=
∑
i
∑
ti
E
c
[pi(ti, c)] ·
fi(ti) + ∑
t′i∈Ti
λi(t
′
i, ti)−
∑
t′i∈T+i
λi(ti, t
′
i)

+
∑
i
∑
ti
E
c
pii(ti, c) ·
 ∑
t′i∈T+i
ti · λi(ti, t′i)−
∑
t′i∈Ti
t′i · λi(t′i, ti)− fi(ti) · c

(1)
Definition 9. A feasible dual solution λ is useful if maxpi∈P ({Fi}ni=1),p L(λ, pi, p) <∞.
Similar to [7], we show that every useful dual solution forms a flow.
Lemma 27. A dual solution λ is useful if and only if it forms the following flow:
• Nodes: For every i ∈ [n] and ti ∈ Ti a node ti. A source s and a sink ∅.
• For every i ∈ [n] and ti ∈ Ti, a flow of weight fi(ti) from s to ti.
• For every i ∈ [n] and ti ∈ Ti, t′i ∈ T+i , a flow of weight λi(ti, t′i) from ti to t′i.
Proof. Suppose there exists i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti, t′i ∈ T+i such that
fi(ti) +
∑
t′i∈Ti
λi(t
′
i, ti)−
∑
t′i∈T+i
λi(ti, t
′
i) 6= 0
Without loss of generality, suppose it’s positive. Notice that pi(ti, c) is unconstrained. Thus when
Ec[pi(ti, c)] → +∞, the Lagrangian also goes to +∞ (see Equation 1). Hence for every i ∈ [n], ti ∈
Ti, t
′
i ∈ T+i ,
fi(ti) +
∑
t′i∈Ti
λi(t
′
i, ti)−
∑
t′i∈T+i
λi(ti, t
′
i) = 0
It’s essentially the flow conservation equation for node ti. Thus λ forms a flow. On the other hand, if λ
forms a flow, the Lagrangian only depends on pi and thus bounded since pi is bounded.
For any useful dual solution λ, by Lemma 27, we can replace
∑
t′i∈T+i λi(ti, t
′
i) by fi(ti)+
∑
t′i∈Ti λi(t
′
i, ti)
in Equation (1) and simplify L(λ, pi, p). For any BIC and interim IR mechanism M = (pi, p), both λi(ti, t′i)
and Ec[(ti ·pii(ti, c)−pi(ti, c))− (ti ·pii(t′i, c)−pi(t′i, c))] are non-negative for all i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti, t′i ∈ T+i .
Thus by Equation (1), L(λ, pi, p) ≥ PROFIT(M). We have the following lemma.
Lemma 28. (Restatement of Lemma 2) For any useful dual solution λ and any BIC, interim IR mechanism
M = (x, p),
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PROFIT(M) ≤ E
t,c
[∑
i
pii(ti, c) · (Φ(λ)i (ti)− c)
]
where
Φ
(λ)
i (ti) = ti −
1
fi(ti)
·
∑
t′i∈Ti
λ(t′i, ti)(t
′
i − ti)
can be viewed as buyer i’s virtual value function.
B Missing Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider a mechanism M that is ex-post implementable. For every i, ti, let Ai(ti) be
buyer i’s (possibly randomized) equilibrium strategy, when her type is ti. It specifies all the actions that the
buyer takes in mechanism M . For every c, let Xi( ~A, c) be the vector of (possibly randomized) indicator
variables that indicate whether buyer i gets each item j when buyers choose strategies ~A = (A1, ..., An) and
the seller’s realized cost vector is c; let Pi( ~A, c) be the payment for the buyer. For every i and t−i, denote
A−i(t−i) = (A1(t1), ..., Ai−1(ti−1), Ai+1(ti+1), ..., An(tn)).
Since A is an equilibrium strategy for the buyers, for every i, ti, t′i ∈ Ti, acting as Ai(ti) induces more
utility than Ai(ti), when the buyer’s type is ti and other buyers follow strategy A−i. We have
E
c,t−i
[ti ·Xi(Ai(ti), A−i(t−i), c)− Pi(Ai(ti), A−i(t−i), c)] ≥
E
c,t−i
[ti ·Xi(Ai(t′i), A−i(t−i), c)− Pi(Ai(t′i), A−i(t−i), c)]
(2)
We now define the direct mechanism M ′ = (x, p) as follows: for every profile (t, c), let xi(t, c) =
Xi(A(t), c) and pi(t, c) = Pi(A(t), c) for all i. It’s the allocation and payment rule when the reported type
profile is t and the seller’s realized cost vector is c. Then Inequality (2) is equivalent to: for every i, ti, t′i ∈ Ti
E
c,t−i
[ti · xi(ti, t−i, c)− pi(ti, t−i, c)] ≥ Ec,t−i[ti · xi(t
′
i, t−i, c)− pi(t′i, t−i, c)]
It’s exactly the BIC constraint for M ′. Thus, M ′ is BIC.
Moreover, each buyer can choose not to participate in M , so Ec,t−i [ti · Xi(Ai(ti), A−i(t−i), c) −
Pi(Ai(ti), A−i(t−i), c)] ≥ 0, which implies that Ec,t−i [ti · xi(ti, t−i, c) − pi(ti, t−i, c)] ≥ 0. Hence, M ′ is
also interim IR. 2
Proof of Theorem 4: Let Φ(λ)(·) be the virtual value function induced by the above canonical flow λ. By
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Lemma 2 and Lemma 3,
PROFIT(M) ≤
∑
i
E
ti,c
∑
j
piij(ti, c) · (Φ(λ)ij (tij)− cj)

=
∑
i
E
ti,c
∑
j
1[ti ∈ R(β)ij ] · piij(ti, c) · (ϕ˜ij(tij)− cj)

+
∑
i
E
ti,c
∑
j
1[ti 6∈ R(β)ij ] · piij(ti, c) · (max{βij(c), cj} − cj)

+
∑
i
E
ti,c
∑
j
1[ti 6∈ R(β)ij ] · piij(ti, c) · (tij −max{βij(c), cj})

≤
∑
i
E
ti,c
∑
j
1[ti ∈ R(β)ij ] · piij(ti, c) · (ϕ˜ij(tij)− cj)
 (MOST-SURPLUS)
+ 2 ·
∑
i
∑
j
E
c
[qij(c) · (max{βij(c), cj} − cj)] (PROPHET)
+
∑
i
E
ti
∑
j
1[ti ∈ R(β)ij ] · v¯(β)i (ti, [m]\{j})
 (LESS-SURPLUS)
The first inequality is due to Lemma 2, and the first equality is due to Lemma 3. The second inequality is
because: For the second term, notice that max{βij(c), cj} − cj ≥ 0, we bound the indicator by 1 and use
the fact that Eti [piij(ti, c)] = 2 · qij(c) for every c; For the third term, notice that for every i, ti ∈ R(β)ij and
c, since pi is feasible, we have∑
k 6=j
piij(ti, c) · (tik −max{βij(c), cj}) ≤ max
S∈Fi,j 6∈S
∑
k∈S
(tik −max{βij(c), cj}).
Taking expectation over c, the RHS equals to v¯(β)i (ti, [m]\{j}). Thus the inequality holds. 2
C Missing Proofs from Section 5
Proof of Lemma 6:
Monotonicity: Fix any t ∈ T , U ⊆ V ⊆ [m]. For all c we have
maxS⊆U,S∈F
∑
j∈S(tj−cj) ≤ maxS⊆V,S∈F
∑
j∈S(tj−cj). Taking expectation over c on both sides proves
the monotonicity.
Subadditivity:
Fix any t ∈ T and U, V ⊆ [m]. For every c, let S∗(c) = argmaxS⊆U∪V,S∈F
∑
j∈S(tj − cj). Clearly,
tj − cj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ S∗(c). Notice that S∗(c) ∩ U ⊆ U and S∗(c) ∩ U ∈ F ; also S∗(c) ∩ V ⊆ V and
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S∗(c) ∩ V ∈ F . We have
max
S⊆U∪V,S∈F
∑
j∈S
(tj − cj) ≤
∑
j∈S∗(c)∩U
(tj − cj) +
∑
j∈S∗(c)∩V
(tj − cj)
≤ max
S⊆U,S∈F
∑
j∈S
(tj − cj) + max
S⊆V,S∈F
∑
j∈S
(tj − cj)
Taking expectation over c on both sides, we have v¯(t, U ∪ V ) ≤ v¯(t, U) + v¯(t, V ).
No externalities: fix any t ∈ T , S ⊆ [m] and any t′ ∈ T such that t′j = tj for all j ∈ S. To prove
v¯(t′, S) = v¯(t, S), it suffices to show that for any c,
max
U⊆S,U∈F
∑
j∈U
(tj − cj) = max
U⊆S,U∈F
∑
j∈U
(t′j − cj)
It follows directly from the fact that t′j = tj for all j ∈ S. 2
D Missing Proofs from Section 6
Proof of Lemma 24:
Monotonicity: Fix any ti, U ⊆ V ⊆ [m]. For all c we have
maxS⊆U∩Ci(ti),S∈Fi
∑
j∈S(tij −max{βij(c), cj}) ≤ maxS⊆V ∩Ci(ti),S∈Fi
∑
j∈S(tij −max{βij(c), cj}).
Taking expectation over c on both sides proves the monotonicity.
Subadditivity:
Fix any ti andU, V ⊆ [m]. For every c, let S∗(c) = argmaxS⊆(U∪V )∩Ci(ti),S∈Fi
∑
j∈S(tij−max{βij(c), cj}).
Clearly, tij−max{βij(c), cj} ≥ 0 for all j ∈ S∗(c). Notice that S∗(c)∩U ⊆ U∩Ci(ti) and S∗(c)∩U ∈ Fi;
also S∗(c) ∩ V ⊆ V ∩ Ci(ti) and S∗(c) ∩ V ∈ Fi. We have
max
S⊆(U∪V )∩Ci(ti),S∈Fi
∑
j∈S
(tij −max{βij(c), cj})
≤
∑
j∈S∗(c)∩U
(tij −max{βij(c), cj}) +
∑
j∈S∗(c)∩V
(tij −max{βij(c), cj})
≤ max
S⊆U∩Ci(ti),S∈Fi
∑
j∈S
(tij −max{βij(c), cj}) + max
S⊆V ∩Ci(ti),S∈Fi
∑
j∈S
(tij −max{βij(c), cj})
Taking expectation over c on both sides, we have µi(ti, U ∪ V ) ≤ µi(ti, U) + µi(ti, V ).
No externalities: fix any ti, S ⊆ [m] and any ti such that t′ij = tij for all j ∈ S. To prove µi(t′i, S) =
µi(ti, S), it suffices to show that for any c,
max
U⊆S∩Ci(ti),U∈Fi
∑
j∈U
(tij −max{βij(c), cj}) = max
U⊆S∩Ci(ti),U∈Fi
∑
j∈U
(t′ij −max{βij(c), cj})
It follows directly from the fact that t′ij = tij for all j ∈ S.
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Now we prove that µi(ti, ·) has Lipschitz constant τi. For any ti, t′i, and set X,Y ⊆ [m], define set
H =
{
j ∈ X ∩ Y : tij = t′ij
}
. Since µi(·, ·) has no externalities, µi(ti, H) = µi(t′i, H). Therefore,
|µi(ti, X)− µi(t′i, Y )| = max
{
µi(ti, X)− µi(t′i, Y ), µi(t′i, Y )− µi(ti, X)
}
≤ max{µi(ti, X)− µi(t′i, H), µi(t′i, Y )− µi(ti, H)} (Monotonicity)
≤ max{µi(ti, X\H), µi(t′i, Y \H)} (Subadditivity)
≤ τi ·max {|X\H|, |Y \H|}
≤ τi · (|X∆Y |+ |X ∩ Y | − |H|)
The second last inequality is because µi(ti, ·) is subadditive and for any item j ∈ C〉(ti) (C〉(t′i)) the single-
item valuation v¯ij(tij) (v¯ij(t′ij)) is less than τi.
2
E Computing the Simple Mechanisms for the Single Buyer Case
In this section, we briefly discuss how to compute the simple mechanisms used in Section 5 in polynomial
time. For the sell-items-separately mechanism, for every c, let pˆj(c) be the posted price of the mecha-
nism constructed in [11], which approximates OPT-REVCOPIES-UD(c). According to Lemma 4, selling the
items separately with price pˆj(c) + cj when the seller’s cost is c can achieves profit at least half of the
MOST-SURPLUS.
For the permit-selling mechanisms, we first point out that value oracle for the valuation v¯ can be (ap-
proximately) implemented efficiently, given an algorithm for the following maximization problem over the
feasibility constraint F : maxS∈F
∑
j∈S(tj − cj), for every (t, c). Given t as an input, for every c the oracle
uses the algorithm to obtain the favorite bundle and then calculates the expected utility. The computation
of the oracle requires sampling from the cost distribution TS , but it’s not hard to argue that a polynomial
number of samples suffices. Besides, the conversion in Lemma 5 is also polynomial time, since the permit-
selling mechanism follows the same allocation and payment rule in the first stage as the mechanism in the
revenue setting. According to [9], both the Selling Separately mechanism and Bundling mechanism used to
bound NON-FAVREV(v¯) can be computed efficiently given the value oracle for v¯. And the two mechanisms
can be converted to the PS and PB mechanism accordingly in polynomial time.
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